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When Public Trust Is Broken: The Case of a Former State Department Staffer Pleading Guilty in a Fraud Scheme
In April 2025, a story emerged from Washington that underscored how even trusted government officials can betray public trust — and how the justice system responds when they do. Levita Almuete Ferrer, a former Senior Budget Analyst at the U.S. Department of State, pleaded guilty to embezzling more than $650,000 from the federal government — a criminal admission that has raised questions about oversight, accountability, and the systems designed to prevent such abuses.
This case — involving detailed manipulation of financial authority, concealment through bookkeeping tools, and ultimately a guilty plea — serves as both a cautionary tale and a reminder of the importance of vigilance in government operations. Below, we explore the who, what, how, and why of this fraud scheme, its consequences, and its broader meaning for public service and accountability.
Who Is Levita Almuete Ferrer?
Levita Almuete Ferrer, also known as Levita Brezovic, is a 64-year-old former budget analyst who worked for the U.S. State Department in the Office of the Chief of Protocol — a division responsible for budgeting and administrative functions related to the State Department’s diplomatic operations.
In that role, she had signature authority over a State Department checking account, meaning she had the power to sign certain financial instruments — a level of trust that would later make it possible for her to commit a serious crime against the very institution she served.
The Fraud Scheme: What Happened
From March 2022 through April 2024, Ferrer exploited her access to official financial accounts to carry out a systematic embezzlement scheme that defrauded the U.S. government of more than $650,000.
Here’s how the scheme unfolded — step by step:
1. Signature Authority Abuse
Ferrer used her legal authority over a State Department checking account to issue 63 checks — 60 payable to herself and three payable to someone with whom she had a personal relationship. Each check was printed and signed using her official signature.
2. Concealment Through Accounting Software
To hide her wrongdoing, Ferrer used a shared QuickBooks accounting account maintained by the department. In QuickBooks, she would enter her name as the payee when generating checks. After printing them, she changed the listed payee to that of legitimate vendors — making it difficult for anyone casually browsing the accounts to spot that she was actually benefiting personally.
This method of concealment plays on the lack of robust real-time oversight in some internal accounting systems — a gap that criminals can exploit if checks and entries aren’t audited carefully.
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